only those women and children who conform to majoritarian middle-class values deserve government subsistence benefits.
Because projects that condition eligibility on behavior contravene the mandated eligibility requirements set forth in the Social Security Act," they require the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive the entitlement provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1315. Through this administrative mechanism, President Bush embraced the use of welfare laws to attempt to modify behavior.
This Essay analyzes two of the most popular behavior-modification models of "welfare reform" and places them in historical context. Part I reviews the historical discrimination against women and people of color in our cash assistance programs and discusses the persistent national ambivalence about welfare. Parts II and III critique the effectiveness of the Learnfare and Family Cap proposals respectively, by reviewing their stated goals and demonstrating the empirical inaccuracies of their underlying assumptions. Part IV argues that these "reform" efforts are driven by a New Right agenda, an "ideology of division" that has manipulated public opinion by highlighting racial and gender biases.
I. BEING TRUE TO OUR ROOTS: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
The United States has always been ambivalent about assisting the poor, unsure whether the poor are good people facing difficult times and circumstances or bad people who cannot fit into society. 12 In this Part, I discuss how certain groups, defined primarily by race and gender, have been excluded, included, and once again excluded from public welfare programs.
Public welfare programs in the United States originated as discretionary programs for the "worthy" poor. Local asylums or poorhouses separated the deserving poor, such as the blind, deaf, insane, and eventually the orphaned, from the undeserving, comprising all other paupers including children in families, with wide variation and broad local administrative discretion.' 3 Even for the deserving poor, state initiatives before 1929 were usually permissive and were frequently underfunded.
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The Great Depression provided the impetus for a national framework to provide assistance to the poor. s Local governmental entities were staggering under the costs of relief.
1 6 In addition, the massive unemployment of previously employed, white male voters made it politically impossible to dismiss the poor as responsible for their own situation. 1 7 With the passage of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, the federal government assumed responsibility and appropriated funds to provide cash relief through a program for all needy unemployed persons and their dependents, not just the worthy widows and orphans. 1 s But legislators considered cash relief a temporary measure to last only until the Depression ended. Consistent with the view that welfare undermines the value systems of its recipients, 20 legislators believed that cash relief was emotionally debilitating, while work, in contrast, fostered dignity. 2 ' Thus the Social Security Act of 1935 was a limited statute, targeted to specific populations in the form of three programs: unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, and federal aid to states that chose to provide cash relief to certain unemployables (the old, the blind, and the orphaned). 22 Earlier, broader proposals covering all children in need-not just those without a parent-were rejected. 23 From its inception, the language and administration of the Social Security Act ("the Act") allowed the exclusion of African Americans from the programs. For example, Southern Congressmen defeated statutory language that would have protected African Americans from discrimination in eligibility for old-age pensions. 24 Impelled by their fear that elderly African Americans would help and 96% were white. Of the 3% who were African American, half lived in just two states. The programs included continuous supervision of families to ensure their worthiness. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 9-13 (1965). PRESENT 226-27 (1989) . The significance of the cash assistance programs enacted during the New Deal is debatable. Primary enforcement of the programs was still a local responsibility; however, federal financial participation was established for the first time. Handler, supra note 13, at 479.
MIMI ABRAMOVrTz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIES TO THE
16. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 66-67. 17. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 211-12 (1986). Piven and Cloward juxtapose this assistance of unemployed white men to the lack of response from local relief agencies to the millions of African Americans who were displaced from the rural South by agricultural modernization in the 1950's, but who were without the political power to compel a response. 21. Even in 1935, the year the Social Security Act was passed, President Roosevelt stated that "[clontinued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the national fibre .... "3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 267 (1960) .
22. The result of this selection of programs was a classic continuation of the dichotomy between deserving and undeserving poor:, those whose benefits were tied to attachment to the labor force were the deserving, and those who had not worked were the undeserving. KATZ, supra note 17, at 238-39.
23. BELL, supra note 14, at 27. 24. The words mandating that relief could not be denied to any citizen if qualifications regarding age and need were met, thereby providing some protection to African Americans, were changed to provide only support younger African Americans, who would thus become less pliant field laborers, these same Congressmen eliminated specific language requiring that old-age benefits be "a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health," 2 thereby retaining state discretion over the amount of benefits. 26 African-American leaders had argued that local standards would allow "less assistance to aged Negroes than to aged whites." 27 The small program that covered children living with their mothers, s Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), assisted the children of women who were white, widowed, and had been connected to men for a substantial portion of their lives. 29 Given that population, policymakers considered ADC a temporary program, effective until dependents could be covered under the portion of the Act dealing with male workers' old-age insurance. 30 Although society had ambivalent feelings about supporting this population, 31 it was willing to do so because the job of these white women was to provide good homes for their children. 32 The legislative history of the Social Security Act allowed the states, which administered the ADC program, to condition eligibility upon the sexual morality of ADC mothers through suitable-home or "man-in-the-house" rules. 33 In some The number of Negro cases is few due to the unanimous feeling on the part of the staff and board that there are more work opportunities for Negro women and to their intense desire not to interfere with local labor conditions. The attitude that "they have always gotten along," and that "all they'll do is have more children" is definite .... There is hesitancy on the part of lay boards to advance too rapidly over the thinking of their own communities, which see no reason why the employable Negro mother should not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather than receive a public assistance grant. 36 Contrary to the belief of the Social Security Act's drafters, the ADC program did not decline and disappear. Rather, the civil rights and welfare rights movements of the 1960's and 1970's resulted in the inclusion of many who had been excluded from the original ADC program. 37 The pivotal scholarship of Professor Charles Reich in the 1960's set the stage for the concept of welfare as an entitlement to meet the enduring problem of poverty. 38 Aggressive lawyering on behalf of poor people removed many of the systemic administrative barriers used to keep African-American women off the welfare rolls.
39 As a 34. Alabama denied AFDC payments to the children of any mother cohabitating in or outside her home with a single or married able-bodied man; in Louisiana, any home in which an illegitimate child was born subsequent to the receipt of public assistance was considered unsuitable, and the children in that home were denied benefits. 37. KATZ, supra note 12, at 267. Throughout the 1960's, scholars debated about the existence of a "culture of poverty," which allegedly produced intergenerational poverty perpetuated by a set of values that were different than those held by the rest of society. Id., at 16-43. Proponents of the idea ranged from blaming the victims for their cultural deviance to arguing that the culture of poverty resulted from "a long history of massive deprivations and barriers. 38. Reich, supra note 3. By the late 1960's, most social scientists endorsed the new policy goal of a negative income tax or a minimum standard of living for everyone. Most proposals to achieve this goal would have based eligibility solely on income level, thereby removing the stigmatizing rules previously in place. President Nixon proposed a form of this concept in the 1969 Family Assistance Plan. Opposed both by conservatives (who wanted work to be more integral to benefits) and liberals (who thought the benefit level was too low and the plan too punitive), it was not enacted. DAVID The early 1980's, however, saw a return to the exclusion of the "undeserving poor," now defined as those whose behavior did not adhere to middle-class values. The influential books of New Right scholars George Gilder and Charles Murray echoed the time-worn thesis that the receipt of public assistance creates immorality and dependence, undermines values, and increases poverty. 43 In addition, Murray popularized the idea that poor people are motivated primarily by economic incentives. 4 These ideas form the basis for the current "welfare reform" proposals. Based on individually tailored state demonstration projects supported by Bush Administration Social Security Act waivers, these proposals return to state and local governments the discretion to define who among the poor are sufficiently worthy to receive benefits. 45 In the succeeding two Parts, I discuss two of the most significant proposals, Learnfare and the Family Cap.
with no legal obligation of support) and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding unconstitutional Alabama's disqualification from AFDC any mother cohabiting with man who was not obligated to provide support). However, specified behavior designed to effectuate a public good, such as family planning, was a sufficiently rational reason to defeat an equal protection challenge to state discretion in determining the amount of benefits. 
II. LEARNFARE
In July 1987, at the request of newly elected Governor Tommy G. Thompson, the Wisconsin Legislature passed the first Learnfare statute. 4 6 Leamfare programs condition AFDC eligibility on dependent children's regular school attendance. As originally enacted, the statute targeted only teens who were themselves parents (as opposed to all teens who were part of an AFDC family unit) and provided that teens could not be sanctioned until after they had been given an opportunity to participate in a school program for "children at risk" or "school-age parents.
'47 Governor Thompson used his line-item veto power" to reshape the program: by deleting critical words and provisions, he effectively expanded Learnfare to cover all teens receiving AFDC and eliminated the requirement that teens be referred to special school programs before sanctions would be imposed against them. 49 The Under the program, a teen on AFDC who misses ten unexcused full days of school in a semester is monitored monthly thereafter, and is "sanctioned" if she or he misses two unexcused full days of school in any month 3 A sanction reduces the family's AFDC grant by the entire amount designated for the teen. For example, for a family consisting of a mother and two children, this sanction results in a reduction of $77.60 a month from a total grant of $ 5 1 7 . 6 0 .
5
' During the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years, an average of 2,125 students were sanctioned each month. AFDC families lost $3,080,000 during 1989 alone. 55 There are two official goals of the Wisconsin program. First, the program is intended to ensure that more teenagers on AFDC complete high school or its equivalent and thereby acquire the minimum level of education needed to become productive citizens. Second, the program seeks to establish a relationship of mutual responsibility between the State and AFDC recipients: the State provides assistance to recipients in getting off, and recipients undertake education, training, and job searches that will help them become selfsufficient. 56 At first glance, these goals seem benign; indeed, the notions that children should stay in school and that parents should be responsible for their children are hardly controversial. However, in historical context and in actual operation, Learnfare reinforces the myth that social problems such as truancy are caused by the deviant behavior of welfare recipients.
Why did this program, at this time, emerge to respond to this perceived crisis? The answer to this question requires an examination of the underlying premises of Learnfare. Such an examination reveals that Learnfare is based on a series of empirically faulty assumptions. Consequently, it is not surprising 
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that the Wisconsin program-and for that matter any Learnfare program-will fail to achieve its goals. 57 In recent years national high school dropout rates have declined dramatically: the percentage of white adults between twenty-five and twenty-nine years old who have not completed high school dropped from 36.3% in 1960 to 13.2% in 1985; for African Americans the figure dropped from 60% in 1960 to 17.6% in 1985.
5
1 Ninety-two percent of the AFDC teens subject to Learnfare are meeting the school attendance requirements; 5 9 only 8% are sanctioned. Moreover, Wisconsin's AFDC rolls had begun to decline in mid-1986. 60 Nevertheless, this data neither dampened the support for a punitive program for AFDC recipients nor altered the perception of a welfare or underclass crisis.
A. Learnfare as a Method to Reduce High School Dropout Rates
If Learnfare is to achieve its first stated goal, curbing the high school dropout rate, several assumptions must be made: (1) the mother whose teenager skips school is exercising her free choice within a wide range of options in allowing the child to be truant; (2) the reason for the failure to attend school is endemic to the child's family, not to external causes; and (3) teens are motivated by economic incentives targeted at the family. 57 . Federal regulations require that a governmental regulatory program be administered in a uniform and objective manner. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(iv) (1991). The Wisconsin experience suggests many problems, including poor school recordkeeping, a wide variation in attendance policies among school districts, and a fast track, noncorrective implementation. These will thwart any state's attempt at compliance. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 10-18.
In a sample of administrative hearing decisions regarding appeal of sanctions, 84% struck down the Learnfare sanction as inconsistent with the regulations, and an additional 8% were upheld only because the appeal was filed after the statutory time limit. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 10-11. These errors caused irreparable harm to AFDC families. For example, a computer error, which resulted in a three-month cut in the benefits received by a family headed by a pregnant teen, caused the family to become homeless. George Gerharz, Wisconsin's Learnfare: A Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at A23. In another case, a mother of three high school students periodically lost up to one half of the $617.00 she received each month as a result of administrative errors. Eric Harrison, Truancy Punishment Hitting Home, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1990, at A20. The community affairs director of Milwaukee schools admitted that as many as 50 errors a month occurred because of administrative problems. Id. at A21.
The level of record-keeping errors that resulted in sanctions led to a court order on July 10, 1990, enjoining the state from sanctioning as many as 3,200 teens attending Milwaukee Public Schools. Kronquist v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. July 10, 1990). In an October 23, 1990 stipulation in the case, the state agreed to verify students' attendance records before imposing sanctions, investigate teens' reasons for absences, and issue notices to the teens and their families when they were placed in monitoring status prior to sanctions. Kronquist v. These assumptions ignore both the psychology of teenagers and the realities of poverty. Many of the choices that middle-class families make are inconceivable to poor women who do not have the option of sending their rebellious children to a different school system or to a parochial or private school. They cannot simply move to a less drug-infested neighborhood or put their children into therapy or other specialized counseling. 61 They may not have the money to travel to school for parent-teacher conferences, or to pay for child care for other children while attending them. 62 Even if a mother can ensure that a teen gets to school every morning, she cannot stay there all day, every day, to enforce attendance. As a Milwaukee assistant principal stated, sanctioned students "are not going to realize the value of an education by docking their parents. We've had youngsters brought here by their Learnfare parents at 8 o'clock, and at 9 o'clock they're gone. It's in one door and out the other., 63 Moreover, Learnfare ignores both the wealth of literature demonstrating why teens drop out of school and the many existing programs and strategies to get them to return or remain in school. 64 The motivations for dropping out of school are complex and do not disappear with a simple solution, however politically attractive. 65 Interestingly, a staff memo from the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) originally recommended that, in spite of Governor Thompson's veto of this provision, teens should be referred to social services prior to the imposition of any sanction:
Some kids have problems that prevent them from attending school or learning if they are in school, such as drug or alcohol abuse, or emotional problems due to abuse or neglect. These teens are most likely 61. Social services, such as case management, alternative education, children-at-risk programs, and drug, alcohol and child abuse services for the Learnfare population in the Milwaukee Public Schools are woefully insufficient. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 28-33. For example, in one middle school, a half-time social worker is solely responsible for the school's entire 600 student enrollment, of whom 75% are in AFDC families. With the other half of her time, she is solely responsible for a 1000-student school. Twelve weeks into the semester she had not addressed any of her truancy referrals because she was addressing other problems that "are more pressing than attendance." Id. at 29. Not surprisingly, prior to entry of the Kronquist injunction, more than 75% of those sanctioned were in Milwaukee County. Corbett et aL., supra note 58, at 5. 
See JONATHoN

65.
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 63, at A3. Cooper interviewed Milwaukee teen paren Lorraine Bragg, who was sanctioned for dropping out of school. She stated that her reason for dropping out of school was that she felt classmates "were low-rating me because I had a child." Id. Rather than return to school, she received money from her boyfriend. She later returned to an alternative school established for young mothers because "she was jealous of her sister, a former dropout who was back in school and doing well." Id.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal to be sanctioned because parents will be unable to deal with them. They also may be subjected to further abuse or kicked out of the home altogether. 6 6
The Wisconsin administration rejected this recommendation as too costly. 67 The first study of the program, conducted by the nonpartisan Employment and Training Institute of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (ETI), documented the massive social service needs of those sanctioned. According to the study, 6612 Milwaukee County teens were sanctioned in the first sixteen months of full Learnfare operation, from September 1988 to December 1989. 68 Forty-one percent of children sanctioned in Milwaukee were in families having possible or documented problems with abuse or neglect or were involved in the Children's Court system, 69 indicating that they had social service problems and needed major intervention through the already existing social service system. 70 Only 28% of the 6612 had returned to and were regularly attending 67. Id. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, the Secretary of DHSS defended the imposition of sanctions prior to providing social services to the truant teens. She used the following example:
[I]n Rock County we had an AFDC mother who until her sanction was to occur for her grant because her son had been truant, had no idea that her young son was having problems, and was in fact having alcohol and drug problems. And she was able to get help for him. The program in Rock County was able to serve him and the young man is now back in school; and, of course, the minute he went back to school there was no sanction. Hearings, supra note 51, at 19 (testimony of Patricia A. Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services). Her example, in fact, supports exactly the opposite conclusion: there are multiple and complex reasons for truancy; the system is not effectively making parents aware when problems exist. The offer of social services without imposing the economic hardship might have solved the problem.
In spite of the documented lack of necessary social services, Governor Thompson vetoed attempts to increase the availability and accessibility of such services in the 1989-91 biennial budget. [Vol. 102: 719 school two months after their last sanction. 7 ' Moreover, the number of sanctions did not decline over the first two years of full implementation of the program. 72 In short, teenagers may be unwilling to attend school for reasons including external causes such as violence in the schools, inadequate school services (e.g., special tutoring, alternative educational programs, or drug and alcohol abuse counseling), improper educational placement or assignment, the need to stay at home to babysit or care for a sick sibling. 73 Learnfare makes a series of remarkable assumptions about the maturity and sophistication of teenagers, especially given behavior problems already evident through truancy. For Learnfare to succeed, teens must understand that their nonattendance at school jeopardizes their family's economic stability. They must care about family finances more than their reasons for not attending school, and they must be willing to change their behavior to retain approximately seventy-five dollars per month for Mom. 74 Next, they must not be tempted to use their ability to trigger a sanction as a means to threaten and control their mothers. 75 In fact, Learnfare may lead to increased family stress and create a parental incentive to kick a child out of the home if she or he fails to attend school, thus subverting the program's stated goal of furthering education for poor teens. 
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Targeted teens who were parents themselves were substantially more likely to be sanctioned than dependent teens. JOHN PAWASARAT ET AL., EMPLOYMENT But debates about Learnfare have generally not focused on the empirical validity of the program's underlying assumptions. As the Institute for Research on Poverty noted in criticizing the DHSS' claim of the program's success, no information exists regarding how teens with attendance problems behave in the absence of sanctions. Improved attendance (which did not ultimately result) might be the result of increased cooperation between parents and the welfare system rather than economic sanctions. 77 The dramatic increase in the number of teens sanctioned as the program's first year progressed raises serious doubts about the ability of Learnfare to deter absences.
B. Learnfare as a Tool for Social Contract
The second articulated goal of Learnfare is to create a "social contract" between the government and the welfare family. 78 In other words, in exchange for receiving assistance, the family must comply with certain values or modify its behavior in ways deemed appropriate by policymakers. 79 Once again, this goal is predicated on faulty assumptions. The first is that welfare families are different than average families, that is, that AFDC teens are more likely to be truant than teens in non-AFDC poor families and that an AFDC mother is less responsible for her children's school attendance, less of a parent than the average parent, and does not want the best for her children. 80 Another faulty assumption is that the average non-AFDC family whose child is truant is not receiving "assistance" and therefore should not be required to fulfill a "social contract" with the state. 81 Available data confirms that children in AFDC families do not miss significantly more days of school than other children. The fact that even knowledgeable policymakers such as Senator Moynihan hold the misconception that AFDC children are different from the norm was apparent in a particularly telling exchange at hearings on Learnfare before the Senate Finance Committee: 78. Compare MEAD, supra note 3, at 241-46 ("Benefits must be coupled with meaningful economic and moral obligations from recipients.") with Corbett et al., supra note 58, at 7 ("[T]he lack of services is evidence that government is not living up to its part of the 'social contract."').
79. See 1987 ,Wisconsin Waiver Application, supra note 50, at 10 (explaining expectations about recipients' behavior).
80. Learnfare is seen as a way to get the attention of otherwise disinterested parents. "One way of encouraging attendance among low-income students, those who have been shown to be the most at-risk of dropping out of school is to reduce welfare benefits to parents who fail to take steps to insure that their children attend school as required by law." JosrE FOEHRENBACH, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, Senator MOYNIHAN: That is kind of important.
PREPARING FOR LEARNFARE: SETTING THE CONDmONS FOR A QUESTIONABLE EXPERIMENT 2 (1988) (quoting
California's Commission on Educational Quality
82
Consistent with this testimony, when the Wisconsin legislature was deciding whether to expand Learnfare to cover six-to twelve-year olds, a study by the Urban Research Center of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee reported that "[flor all students in grades two through five only 3 median attendance days and 3.9 mean attendance days, separate non-AFDC students from AFDC students. 83 AFDC children on average attended school 169 days a year while non-AFDC children attended for 172 days. 84 This data has been consistent over many years.
Many families that have gone through a social services assessment and licensing process by the state to become foster families or family day care providers have received sanctions for their teens under Learnfare.Y The bizarre fact that families that the state has approved for child raising are later penalized by the same state for inappropriate child control highlights the irrationality of the Learnfare attendance requirements. 
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take .for their children to get ahead., 87 AFDC mothers agreed with both the general public and members of Congress that improvement of public schools should be either the first or second priority among mechanisms to solve poverty. 88 Learnfare, however, blames the mother, assuming that she is at fault for her child's behavior, regardless of the availability of needed services. It ignores the fact that there will be some teens who will not respond to any social services or incentive (positive or negative) program and that our society already maintains a juvenile justice system to cope with these difficult teens. 89 As one AFDC mother said, "[E]ven probation officers can't make their clients do something if they don't want to." 9 This mother of four wondered whether she should place her two truant teens in care of the county and "let them raise them if they think they can do better." 9 '
Contrast the relationship the government has with non-AFDC parents whose children are truant. Non-AFDC families receive a major tax break for each dependent;" no one questions their continued right to receive this dependency allowance or suggests conditioning that right on the child's school attendance record. State truancy laws are enforced with wide discretion and latitude; there is certainly no automatic judicial referral after ten days absence in a semester. 93 In many states, parents who are not on AFDC can be assessed only a small financial penalty for a child's truancy, and this penalty can be assessed only after a wide range of social services are provided to the truant's family.' One AFDC mother commented on the perversity of singling out poor women: West 199 1) . Even then, the assistant district attorney first tries to work with the family to return the child to school, only beginning legal action when parents fail to cooperate in these efforts. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 28-29.
[Vol. 102: 719 
Welfare Reform Proposals nor their parents suffer from the Learnfare "experiment." Class status, not truancy alone, determined who would be abused by Learnfare. 95 Not surprisingly, the recent study of the effectiveness of Learnfare by ET1 96 showed no positive results, concluding that "in all six school districts the models used did not show improvement in student attendance which could be attributed to the Leamfare requirement." 9 7 In Milwaukee the study found that Learnfare actually increased rather than decreased absences. 98 After selecting ETI as the independent evaluator, the Wisconsin DHSS cancelled ETI's contract for the final Learnfare report due June, 1993. 99 DHSS Secretary Gerald Whitburn called the study the "biased product of liberal opponents of the Republican Governor.
' ' 1 to Even before ETI's evaluation was completed, school officials knew that Learnfare was not meeting its stated goals.
1 ' The assistant principal of a Milwaukee high school, where more than half of the families of the 1250 students receive welfare, noted that few of the 145 sanctioned students were present on the second day of final exams, 1 0 2 and Milwaukee's mayor described Learnfare as an unsuccessful experiment. 0 3 The Milwaukee Public School Board of School Directors opposed the Learnfare Program and its expansion in its February, 1990 statement, relying on a report from the Milwaukee Public School Superintendent that concluded: "The existing Learnfare program has not been shown to be effective in returning teenagers to school; it has not increased school attendance; and it has not reduced the number of school dropouts. In addition, the number of monthly sanctions does not appear to be declining."
1 ' 4 95. Gowens, supra note 90, at 90. 96. QUINN ET AL, supra note 51. Because the federal waiver of the demonstration project allowed Wisconsin to make all AFDC teens subject to Learnfare, thus precluding a randomly assigned control group of AFDC teens, the study was based on a lagged regression analysis which controlled for differences in age, grade level, sex, race, and months on AFDC. The control group was drawn from former AFDC teenagers and teens receiving AFDC prior, to the Learnfare experiment. PAWASARAT ET AL., supra note 72, at 3. 97. Id. at ii. Graduation rates for Milwaukee teens subject to Learnfare were the same as those for the control group-former AFDC Milwaukee teens who entered high school as freshmen in the 1987-88 school year. Id. at 11. [Vol. 102: 719
Learnfare's failure seriously challenges the notion that using threats to cut subsistence programs influences the behavior of those who depend on them. 5 Designed to serve political rhetoric, the program was never supported by empirical data,' 0 6 but rather, was premised on superficial notions about the psychology of poor families.
III. FAMILY CAP
Building on the historic biases reflected in the suitable home and "man-inthe-house" rules, the Family Cap demonstration proposals attempt to influence poor women's decisions about procreation. They are inherently flawed because they are based on the assumption that the value systems of AFDC mothers are fundamentally alien to those of the rest of the population. The proposals, embraced by President Bush, eliminate or reduce additional AFDC benefits for the support of additional children conceived after a mother begins receiving AFDC. New Jersey became the first state to pursue this course of action when it enacted Family Cap legislation on January 21, 1992.107 It received a federal waiver on July 20, 1992.08 Wisconsin has received a waiver from HHS to operate a demonstration project for teen mothers only, 1 0 9 but has not yet received state legislative authorization." 0 105. Even Charles Murray has stated: "The idea that they were going to make Learnfare work is ridiculous.... I know I'm known for putting great stock in economic incentives, but the problem with economic incentives like this one is that if they aren't intertwined with social norms, their effect will be zip. 109. According to the waiver documents, the Parental and Family Responsibility Demonstration Project (PFR) will apply to AFDC teen applicants (single or married) under age 20 who have one child or are pregnant with their first child when they enroll in PFR. The project will be implemented in as many as four counties, including Milwaukee, and is expected to become effective July 1, 1993. Under PFR, if a second child is born, the family will receive approximately one half of the current incremental amount ($38); if a third child is born, the family will receive no additional income. Thompson, however, vetoed the substance of the bill, retaining only the language authorizing the DHSS to seek a federal waiver for an unspecified parental responsibility pilot project. 1991 WIs. Legis. Serv. 39 (West). In his veto message, Governor Thompson stated that he would do his "utmost to see to it that this important program receives a federal waiver and is implemented in Wisconsin." Governor's Message Vetoing Wisconsin offered two reasons for testing a Family Cap Program: (1) to reduce long-term Welfare dependency among families headed by male and female teen parents;... and (2) to delay subsequent births to first-time teen parents who receive AFDC until they are emotionally and financially prepared to support additional children. 112 The New Jersey proposal applies to all AFDC mothers regardless of age; its goal is a more extensive effort at "mutual responsibility." 1 3 The proposal contends that "welfare recipients will be asked to make the same type of decisions based on their income that working families have to make about supporting their family based on the money they earn."
'1 4 The underlying goal of Family Cap programs is for people to plan for their children; the assumption is that middle-class people are intelligent enough to refrain from having children when they cannot support them and that poor women should do likewise. The unspoken motivation is far less racially benign: the stereotypical AFDC mother is African American, urban, lazy, and a "bad mother" who gets pregnant to obtain more AFDC benefits. It follows, according to the argument, that the denial of these additional benefits will curb the pregnancies that the policymakers find so troubling.
As was the case with the Learnfare programs, the underlying assumptions of Family Cap proposals-that AFDC mothers have many children, that they have free access to medical options for family planning, and that they get pregnant in order to receive additional benefits-are unsound. In fact, as of 1990, the average AFDC family, including adults, had 2.9 members; 72.5% of all families on AFDC had only one or two children, and almost 90% had three or fewer children.
5 These figures are no larger than those found among twoEnrolled 1991 Assembly Bill 91 (Aug. 8, 1991), reprinted in 1991 V'is. Laws 39. I11. A high correlation exists between teen childbearing and receipt of AFDC. Nearly 50% of all adolescent mothers and over 75% of unmarried teen mothers receive AFDC within five years of giving birth.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFIcE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR ADOLESCENT MOTHERS xvi (1990).
Evaluations of the total length of time on AFDC vary depending on the time standards used. Compare id. (reporting that almost 50% of adolescent mothers who receive AFDC stop getting benefits for at least three months within one year, and almost 75% leave AFDC within three years) with Greg J. Duncan et al., Welfare Dependence Within and Across Generations, ScIENcE, Jan. 29, 1988, at 467, 468 (asserting that more than 40% of never-married women with young children who began receiving AFDC when they were under 25 years continue to receive it for more than nine years).
112. 1992 Wisconsin Waiver Application, supra note 109, at 1. 114. Id. Because the New Jersey Family Cap proposal is part ofa broader Family Development Program that includes an increased earnings disregard, the program "is based on the same principle that applies to everyone else in our society. If a person is working and has a baby, that person's salary is not automatically increased.... We believe that if a person is given a choice, that person will do what is best for the family which, in this case, is work." Id. at 8. This comment reveals another underlying assumption of the New Jersey program-that AFDC mothers do not work because they can receive AFDC benefits. The relationship between work and welfare is a topic that has engendered a great deal of commentary and is beyond the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 38, at 137-55 (suggesting that current work-welfare programs do little to solve poverty and welfare struggles that single mothers face).
115. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 669.
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 102: 719 parent families in the general population. 16 Moreover, AFDC family size has declined substantially; in 1969, 32.5% of AFDC families had four or more children, and in 1990, only 9.9% had four or more children. 1 7 Contrary to the commonly held perception that teen pregnancies are skyrocketing, teen birthrates have dropped dramatically over the last three decades. 1 ' Furthermore, for those women who wish to terminate their pregnancies, neither abortion facilities nor government funding are necessarily available. 1 1 9 Title X of the Public Health Service Act, the only federal program targeted for the provision of family planning services, was cut by 16% during the 1980's." 2 In addition, even when a woman does obtain birth control, the failure rates for the most reliable forms of contraceptives (i.e., the pill, diaphragms, condoms) range from 6% to 16% per year. ' There are many reasons why AFDC mothers become pregnant or choose to remain pregnant. These reasons include occurrences of unplanned pregnancies (whether due to a lack of information, money, or forethought), the belief that a child solidifies a relationship with the father, 22 represent an economic value (e.g., to serve as agricultural workers, to support parents in their old age),"TI the belief that the significant health problems and infant mortality rates associated with poverty increase the risk that a single woman with only one child will become childless,"A a sense that one's life is so hopeless that having a child gives it value and meaning, 1 5 and the desire to give a grandchild to one's own mother.
1 26 Many of these reasons are equally applicable to non-AFDC, middle-class women.
"Normal" women allegedly have children only when they are economically able to support them.' 27 This is not true. Most people do not view having a baby as the prize for having made it economically, nor do they have a child to gain an additional tax deduction for a dependent.s Just like AFDC recipients, they want to be parents and to share their lives with a child.
29 Of course, some families decide not to have an additional child because they believe that they cannot afford it, but the dollar value placed on whether they can afford it varies widely. Therefore, many upper-income families may have a small number of children because they believe it is critical to provide the child with certain advantages, such as piano lessons or private school education, that never enter the minds of a working class family with more children.
Empirical studies have consistently documented the lack of a correlation between the receipt of AFDC benefits and the child-bearing decisions of unmarried women-even for young, unmarried women. 30 In a recent study 125. Given the correlation between lack of literacy skills, teen pregnancy, and long-term welfare use, a focus on improved school districts, remedial education, and specially tailored programs that provide these teens (before or after becoming mothers) with basic skills is a critical link to reducing teen pregnancy. 126. MOORE, supra note 120, at 5; PREVENTING ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY, supra note 125, at 3-4 (discussing lack of both self-esteem and sex education as significant factors contributing to increased teen pregnancy).
127. Ellen Goodman, Welfare Mothers With an Atritude, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1992, at 19. 128. Such an analysis ignores that when another child is born into a "working" family, the "benefit" received through a federal tax deduction is higher in actual dollars than the incremental amount received by an AFDC recipient in most states. For example, a married couple with one child and income up to $48,700 in 1992 receives a federal tax savings of $345 per year for an additional child; a married couple with one child and income between $48,700 and $99,450 receives a federal tax savings of $645 a year for an additional child. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES ET AL, SELECTED BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WELFARE PROGRAMS, FAMILY CAP PROPOSALS WILL NOT PREVENT PREGNANCY BUT WILL HARM FAMILIEs 2 (Feb. 21, 1992). See also Ross, supra note 81, at 1520 (speculating that if states were to defend federal ceiling on number of dependents that could be claimed for tax purposes as rationally providing family planning incentives, public outcry would be far more persuasive and impassioned than it has been against family planning proposals for "morally weak" poor).
129. of AFDC recipients by the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, 100% of the mothers said their ability to receive AFDC had no effect on the decision to have a child.
13 1 In addition, AFDC families are not larger in those states with larger AFDC grants,1 32 and teen birth rates are not higher in the states with higher AFDC grants. 133 The number of female-headed families has continued to grow since the early 1970's, even though AFDC benefits, adjusted for inflation, have decreased by 30%. 3 1 Women receiving AFDC are less likely than non-AFDC recipients to want an additional child,1 35 less likely to have multiple pregnancies, and more likely to practice contraception. 36 Furthermore, the incremental increase that an AFDC family receives when a new child enters the family is so small that it does not even cover such basic essentials as diapers, clothing, bottles and formula. In Wisconsin, for example, an additional third child adds $100 to the grant; in New Jersey, $64; in Mississippi, $24. 137 Thus if economics were really the driving factor in an AFDC mother's decision to have a child, she would make the "rational" decision not to do so.
If Mississippi's economic disincentive of giving only an additional $24 for another child has not reduced AFDC family size or curbed teenage birth rate, Wisconsin's reducing the grant increment from $77 to $39 is also likely to be ineffective. 38 If poor people do not change their behavior based on the the 1980s, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 735 (1990) . This is an excellent example of how the scope of the inquiry defines the debate; by focusing on whether AFDC fosters pregnancy, discussion is diverted from true solutions for teenage pregnancy.
131 In the face of uniform data that Learnfare, Family Cap, and other behavioral modification "welfare reform" proposals will not accomplish their articulated goals, why do policymakers, politicians, and the American public continue to espouse and support them? 141 Why does American society cling to the myth that unlike the majority, welfare recipients have deviant values that can be manipulated solely by the economics of a meager AFDC grant? 42 What has changed since the passage of the Social Security Act during the New Deal? Have those changes affected our historical ambivalence toward and perceptions of poor women and children? The answer to these questions lies in a New Right agenda, 143 which I call an ideology of division, playing to America's deepest racial fears and to resentment of the poor, single, unemployed mother. 144 Beginning in the early 1980's, the New Right's economic strategy was to privilege the rich, thereby causing the "trickle down" of largesse from the wealthy to the poor. The articulated ideology was that by investing, the wealthy would create opportunities for those less fortunate. 1 45 However, the result of supply-side economics has been redistribution of money to the rich, increased poverty, and a decline of the buying power of wages.
1 46 To legitimate the [Vol. 102: 719 failure of their economic agenda, the New Right sought to divert workers' justified anger from the wealthy and to focus it on welfare recipients, those who, it was argued, had not seized the offered opportunity, did not share the national work ethic, and whose values seemed to deviate dramatically from the national ideology. 147 The articulation of the "otherness"' 4 of the poor-their amorality and depravity-is longstanding. 149 But the unique contribution of the American New Right has been to manipulate public attitudes through the subtle use of racism, scapegoating and stereotypes. It is no accident that the bulk of conservative scholarship about public assistance has focused on AFDC, the social welfare program that highlights most graphically race and gender distinctions. 50 Thus the New Right has achieved popular acceptance for the misuse of AFDC laws,' 5 ' shifting our attention from national structural problems to the purported social deviance of individual women of color.
In the current variation of "otherness," the average citizen considers all AFDC recipients as part of the "underclass,4 53 i.e., African-American, longterm welfare recipients who live in inner-city ghettos and regularly have babies.' 54 The stereotype also holds that unlike whites, these undeserving poor have warped values, 155 which do not include the desire for such things as good schools, jobs, or safe streets.
15 6 The Los Angeles riots confirmed the deep belief of white Americans that the underclass of color is not only permanent, but determined to undermine white, middle-class ways of life.
57 Consequently, the current "welfare reform" proposals are designed to "re-exclude" these "undeserving" poor, until they modify their behavior and prove they are worthy of our largesse. 58 The New Right's success in drawing support from working and middle class whites indicates the depth and pervasiveness of the myth of deviance regarding the AFDC African-American underclass.
5 9 By exploiting a stereotype based on race and demerit, the New Right encourages the average white citizen to distance herself or himself from the African-American welfare mother and her children.
60 While a white may support income transfer programs for the elderly because she or he anticipates growing old someday, ' whites know that they will never be African American, fourteen years old and pregnant. They can freely discount poverty as the moral failing of urban African-American culture, rather than recognizing it as a social condition cutting across racial and geographic lines and entrapping even the morally virtuous. The myth enables whites to nourish their deeply held belief that they will never be poor because they work hard, keep their kids in school, and make rational family planning decisions. 62 Contrary to the myth, empirical data does not support the stereotype of welfare recipients as African Americans living in urban ghettos. Only 39.7% of all AFDC recipients in 1990 were African American. 6 3 Non-Hispanic whites comprised 38.1% of AFDC recipients in 1990. The percentage of AfricanAmerican recipients has in fact decreased from 45.8% since 19 7 3 .164 Moreover, only 8.9% of the total poor live in "ghettos." 16 5 The median stay on AFDC in 1990 was twenty-three months.1 66 Under any of the prevailing definitions, the urban "underclass" is but a small percentage of the AFDC population. 67 Nevertheless, by focusing on images of the underclass welfare mother, the New Right has reduced the entire poverty debate to the AFDC program. The New Right advocates have transformed the increase of minorities on AFDC rolls in the 1960's and 1970's into a racially dependent definition of poverty.1 68 The New Right inflames outrage at the lack of individual responsibility in the African-American community, thus making it acceptable to express blatantly racist concepts without fear or shame. 169 The New Right has played not only to racial fears and prejudice, but also to the dream of intact families and the fantasy of women as moral guardians. 170 In the New Right mythology, single mothers, particularly those not economically "independent," are necessarily sexually overactive and morally deviant. 171 This gender bias, like racial stereotyping, is not new to the welfare debate. Our social welfare policy has always preferred white women who were related to a man in the labor market or were in the workforce themselves. 172 The demographics of the labor market, however, have changed. Since the early 1970's, as real wages fell and as buying power declined, women have entered the workplace in unprecedented numbers. 173 They went to work outside the home not only because the women's movement opened some previously closed doors, but also because of the belief that two incomes were necessary to maintain a desired lifestyle. 74 A growing number of women now would prefer not to work, but feel trapped by perceived economic circumstances. 75 Social expectations about women as domestic caretakers have not adjusted to the realities of working women. Women are still expected to do the bulk of the child care, home care, and nurturing, and they are often overwhelmed by the substantial and conflicting demands on their time. 1 76
The New Right's ideology of division channels that dissatisfaction toward welfare mothers: why should a woman who wants to be a homemaker have to work outside of the home and support through her tax dollars the AFDC recipient who has the "luxury" of staying at home to raise her children? 177 This sentiment has prompted behavioral modification proposals like Learnfare and Family Cap, which seek to punish and devalue the "nonproductive" mother for the ostensible reason that she at least should exercise some control over her children and stop getting pregnant.
This attempt to use economic motivation to create changed behavior in AFDC mothers and children leads to "solutions" that are contrary to empirical evidence and thus cannot solve the problems for which they are ostensibly designed. "Welfare reform" programs such as Learnfare and Family Cap do not solve burgeoning social problems; they reflect only political expedience and culturally biased mythology.
